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"For reasons stated in an opinion filed with the clerk, the judgment of
the court of appeals is affirmed. Our opinion is unanimous."
That is how Byron White typically made an oral announcement of his
opinion for the Court. Occasionally, however, he would summarize his
opinion extemporaneously. In the legislative veto case in which he was one
of two dissenters,1 his oral statement of his position was so persuasive that
it prompted an unplanned oral response from the author of the majority.
It was during my first Term on the Court that Byron taught me that his
straightforward expository style could be extremely convincing. On March
24, 1976, the Court heard argument in the Buffalo Forge case,2 which
involved the Boys Markets3 exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act.4 After
our conference, the Chief Justice assigned me the opinion reversing the
judgment of the Second Circuit. After I circulated my draft of a majority
opinion, Byron prepared a dissent that persuaded two of our colleagues to
change their votes. The opinion of the Court that was handed down on July
6, 1976, was therefore his to announce, and it was an affirmance rather than
a reversal.
Potter Stewart was not one of the Justices who changed his vote in
response to Byron's draft dissent in the Buffalo Forge case. I believe,
t Associate Justice, Supreme Court of the United States.
1. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 967 (1983) (White, J., dissenting).
2. Buffalo Forge Co. v. United Steelworkers of Am., 428 U.S. 397 (1976).
3. Boys Mas., Inc. v. Retail Clerks Union, Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970) (permitting a
federal district court to enjoin a labor union from striking-in breach of a no-strike provision of a
collective bargaining agreement-over a grievance that the union had agreed to arbitrate).
4. 29 U.S.C. § 104 (2000).
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however, that Byron's opinion in an earlier case, Griswold v. Connecticut,
5
had a significant impact on Potter's appraisal of a constitutional issue of
profound importance-the doctrine of substantive due process-in later
cases. The basic issue raised in Griswold was whether the Federal
Constitution contains a substantive constraint on a state's power to prohibit
the use of contraceptives by married couples.6 Connecticut's answer to that
question was succinctly stated in its brief on the merits:
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The decision of the General Assembly of Connecticut that the
use of contraceptives should be banned is a proper exercise of the
police power of the state.7
By a 7-2 vote, the Court rejected that submission, relying on three quite
different rationales: a right to marital privacy created by the "penumbras"
emanating from various parts of the Bill of Rights,8 a right to marital
privacy protected by the Ninth Amendment, 9 and the substantive content of
the Due Process Clause itself.'0
Justice Stewart's dissent, like Justice Black's,' rejected all three
rationales,12 viewing the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause as
extending only to a guarantee against vague statutes and procedural
unfairness.1 3 While Justice White also rejected the first two rationales
advanced in support of the Court's holding, he, like Justice Harlan,
14
concurred in the Court's judgment. 15 In doing so, Justice White relied
squarely on the proposition that the Clause itself protects a realm of
personal liberty that the state may not regulate without substantial
justification. 
6
In Roe v. Wade,17 a later case involving the constitutionality of a Texas
statute prohibiting abortions, which was also decided by a 7-2 vote, the
roles of Justices Stewart and White were reversed. Of the four opinions
supporting the Court's judgment, it was Justice Stewart's that
5. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
6. Id.
7. Brief for Appellee at 9, Griswold (No. 496).
8. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484 (Douglas, J.).
9. Id. at 499 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
10. Id. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502 (White, J., concurring in the
judgment).
11. Id. at 527 (Black, J., dissenting).
12. Id. at 527-31 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 528.
14. Id. at 499-502 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment).
15. Id. at 502-07 (White, J., concurring in the judgment).
16. Id. at 502-04.
17. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal
[Vol. 112: 969
Stevens
unambiguously relied on the doctrine of substantive due process.' 8 Potter
began by recognizing, as he had already done earlier in Griswold,19 that
Justice Black's opinion for the Court in Ferguson v. Skrupa20 had "purported
to sound the death knell for the doctrine of substantive due process., 2 1 Despite
this supposed death knell, Potter argued that "the Griswold decision can be
rationally understood only as a holding that the Connecticut statute
substantively invaded the 'liberty' that is protected by the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment.",22 Potter supported this statement with
citations to Justice White's opinion in Griswold, and to the series of cases on
which Justice White had relied in that opinion. In his dissent, Byron did
not disavow those cases, although he obviously construed them more
narrowly than Potter did.24
Potter and Byron again disagreed with one another about the proper
analysis of the next substantive due process issue to confront the Court after
Roe, but this time it was Potter who took the narrower view. Moore v. City
of East Cleveland involved the validity of an ordinance that permitted a
grandmother to share her home with two grandchildren if they were brothers
but not if they were cousins.25 The net result of the six opinions analyzing the
26issue was a judgment invalidating the ordinance. Potter and Byron both
dissented, but for quite different reasons. In Potter's view, no constitutionally
protected interest in liberty had been infringed,27 whereas Byron refused to
give the term "liberty" such a "crabbed construction. '"2 8 In Byron's opinion,
the infringing legislation was sufficiently justified by the city's interest in
limiting the number of people who can occupy a single-family residence.29
Cases like Griswold, Roe, and Moore illustrate the inevitability of
disagreement among independent and thoughtful judges charged with the task
of interpreting broad language in the constitutional text. Students of those
opinions sometimes infer that such disagreements are partly due to personal
friction or disrespect. Nothing could be further from the truth. Indeed, I have
often thought that Tranio's reference to litigating advocates applies with
equally full force to members of our Court: "[A]s adversaries do in law-[we]
18. Id. at 171 (Stewart, J., concurring).
19. 381 U.S. at 528 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
20. 372 U.S. 726 (1963).
21. Roe, 410 U.S. at 167 (Stewart, J., concurring).
22. Id. at 168.
23. Id. at 167-71.
24. White's dissent from the holding in Roe is found in Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 221-23
(1973) (White, J., dissenting).
25. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 536-37 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 547 (White, J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 550-51.
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[s]trive mightily, but eat and drink as friends."30 Byron was a true friend of
those with whom he sometimes mightily disagreed. That judgment is
supported by "opinions" filed by retired Chief Justice Burger, retired Justices
Brennan and Blackmun, and myself in the Brigham Young University Law
Review.
31
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30. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TAMING OF THE SHREW act 1, sc. 2, 11. 278-79, in 2 THE
COMPLETE OXFORD SHAKESPEARE 481, 491 (Stanley Wclls et al. eds., 1987).
31. Tribute, "Cheers! ":A Tribute to Justice Byron R. White, 1994 BYU L. REV. 209.
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